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KEEPING PACE WITH THE PROGRESS OF THE 
WORLD: ARTICLE 9 OF THE JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTION† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes. 
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.1 
Japan’s previous constitution, the Meiji Constitution,2 was revised in 
1946 as a term of Japan’s surrender to the United States on August 15, 
1945.3 The new constitution was designed explicitly to counter the fact 
that “no modern or current world power was more aggressively militaristic 
or culturally more adulatory of military virtues” than pre-surrender Japan.4 
Since 1945, Japan’s constitutionally-mandated pacifism has become a 
 † The title comes from Emperor Hirohito’s radio broadcast announcement of Japan’s 
surrender, which he concluded by telling his subjects to “[c]ultivate the ways of rectitude; foster 
nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as to enhance Japan’s glory and keep pace with the 
progress of the world.” Hirohito, Announcement of Japan’s Surrender (Aug. 15, 1945), in MARK D. 
ROEHRS & WILLIAM A. RENZI, WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC 252–53 (2004) (emphasis omitted).  
 1. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 9 (Japan), reprinted in English in THE CONSTITUTION 
OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947–67, app. at 303 (Japanese Ministry of Justice trans. 1958, 
Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968) (1947) [hereinafter Article 9]. 
 2. MEIJI KENPŌ [Meiji Constitution, 1889] (Japan), reprinted in English in JAPAN’S 
CONTESTED CONSTITUTION, at 179–88 (2001) (M. Ito trans. 1889, Glen D. Hook & Gavan 
McCormack eds., 2001).  
 3. See Potsdam Declaration, U.S.-P.R.C.-U.K., ¶¶ 10, 12, July 26, 1945, reprinted in 
THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION app. 1 at 176. The 
Potsdam Declaration states that the Japanese government must establish a “peacefully inclined and 
responsible government,” and must “remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of 
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.” Id. The Constitution has not been revised since 
1947. R.P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HISTORY: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 85 
(2004).  
 4. Lawrence W. Beer, Peace in Theory and Practice Under Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, 
81 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 816 (1998). 
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powerful influence on every aspect of Japanese society.5 This ingrained 
pacifist sentiment, however, must be reconciled with the creation, and 
continuously expanded role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (“SDF”). Sixty 
years after its defeat in World War II, Japan now has the second largest 
defense budget in the world6 and has deployed the SDF to aid in various 
international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions.7 
This Note will examine Japan’s struggle to “keep pace with the world” 
while adhering to Article 9 of its constitution. First, this Note will examine 
Japan’s early nationalism and its imperialistic conquests prior to its 
surrender to the allies in 1945.8 From there, the Note turns to the revision 
of Japan’s Constitution and the development of Article 9.9 Next, the Note 
examines some of the factors that have so far proved strong inhibitors of 
Article 9 amendment: judicial abstention from the constitutionality debate; 
cultural attachment to pacifism as a reaction to horrors witnessed in war; 
and regional politics.10 Although this Note concludes that amendment of 
Article 9 will be the result of a natural and glacial evolution of values as 
the current younger generation takes over politics,11 the Note suggests that, 
in the meantime, Japan will have to prove to the world that its dedication 
to pacifism is a workable and desirable modus operandi in international 
collective decision-making and that it can be an effective world player 
while maintaining this ideal. Ultimately, this Note concludes that through 
Article 9’s pacifist principles,12 Japan has the opportunity to become an 
 5. Id. at 818–19. 
 6. MICHAEL J. GREEN, JAPAN’S RELUCTANT REALISM 62 (2001). 
 7. Id. at 63. Green notes that the Maritime SDF was sent to the Persian Gulf in 1991 for 
minesweeping activities; that the Ground SDF was sent to Cambodia in 1992–1993; and that the SDF 
has participated in peacekeeping operations or humanitarian missions in Mozambique, the Golan 
Heights, and Honduras. Id. Additionally, he notes that the SDF has participated in joint training 
exercises with the Russian and South Korean navies. Id. 
 8. See infra notes 13–62 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 63–95 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 96–141 and accompanying text. 
 11. Alan Dupont similarly believes that change will occur through “an evolutionary process in 
which Japan seeks a greater voice on issues that are central to its security concerns in Asia or when 
there are opportunities to dilute the unilateralist tendencies of the US and encourage more 
collaborative behaviour,” but does not attribute this to generational turnover. ALAN DUPONT, LOWY 
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, UNSHEATHING THE SAMURAI SWORD: JAPAN’S CHANGING 
SECURITY POLICY 17, Paper 03 (2004). 
 12. This is contrary to the position taken by one author that Article 9 is a “self-inflicted mark of 
Cain” and is an “[e]ntrenching disabilit[y]” which “seems to say to the world: ‘There is a bad seed 
here in this nation, and it is planted from generation to generation.’” George P. Fletcher, Liberals and 
Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1537 (2002). This Note 
explicitly rejects this type of pessimism about the implications of Article 9 for future generations. 
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international leader by increasing its involvement with the United Nations 
and other international organizations. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Japan’s Imperialist Expansion and World War II Experience 
1. The Rise to Militarism: From the Seventeenth Century to World 
War II 
Japan’s geographical isolation allowed Japanese civilization to develop 
in relative seclusion, creating a sense of unique Japanese identity.13 For 
nearly three centuries, Japan was ruled by a military dictatorship.14 
Although several European countries had established trading posts in 
Japan by the seventeenth century,15 Japan’s military dictatorship expelled 
all but the Dutch, due to increasing suspicions at the number of Japanese 
converting to Christianity.16 Thereafter, the dictatorship imposed a policy 
of national seclusion.17  
Fear of invasion from Russia and encroachment from the Western 
world strengthened the perception that seclusion was necessary in order to 
preserve Japan.18 By 1825, Japan had a policy of driving away foreign 
vessels and attacking upon sight.19 For two hundred years—until 1853—
 13. ANAND, supra note 3, at 29. Japan was, however, influenced by its interactions with China in 
the development of its culture. Id. China influenced Japan’s written language, form of government, 
teaching methods, philosophy, medical care, and religion. Id. at 29–30. 
 14. Id. at 30. From 1603 to 1868, the Tokugawa Family, a military dictatorship, ruled Japan after 
subduing the feudal lords who had previously controlled Japan. Id. 
 15. Id. at 30. The Portuguese were the first to reach Japan in 1542, followed soon thereafter by 
missionaries and traders. Id. at 30. By the early 1600s, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English 
had established trading posts in Japan. Id. at 31. 
 16. Id. at 31. The Tokugawa did not think the Dutch were Christian because they did not engage 
in any missionary activity. Id. at 31. Because of this, and the Dutch hostility toward the Spanish and 
Portuguese, the Tokugawa allowed the Dutch to remain in Japan. Id. The Dutch, along with the 
Chinese, with whom Japan also maintained trade relations, proved to be an important source of 
knowledge for the Japanese during this period of seclusion. See Marius B. Jansen, Japan in the Early 
Nineteenth Century, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN VOLUME 5, THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
50, 87–92, 97–99. (Marius B. Jansen ed., 1989). 
 17. ANAND, supra note 3, at 31. Marius B. Jansen attributes the policy of seclusion to a sense of 
threat posed by knowledge derived from the outside world. See Jansen, supra note 16, at 51. Jansen 
also points to Russian forays into East Asia as well as news about Napoleon’s conquests as increasing 
Japan’s perception that dealing with the West was dangerous. Id. at 87, 93–97. 
 18. Jansen, supra note 16, at 100–01. 
 19. Id. at 102. 
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the seclusion policy frustrated attempts by England, France, Russia, and 
the United States to trade with Japan.20  
The process of re-establishing normal relations began in July 1853 
when a squadron of four United States warships appeared in Edo Bay.21 
On March 31, 1854, Japan and the United States signed the “Treaty of 
Peace, Amity and Commerce,”22 opening the floodgates for western 
relationships with Japan.23 Shortly thereafter, the British,24 Russians,25 and 
the Dutch all signed similar treaties with Japan.26 In these initial treaties, 
the Japanese grudgingly granted only such minimum concessions as they 
believed would placate the foreigners.27 The foreigners, however, were not 
placated for long: in 1857, Japan and the United States signed a 
convention that vastly expanded the previous treaty.28 The following year, 
 20. ANAND, supra note 3, at 31. During this time, however, Japan continued to trade with the 
Dutch and Chinese, who were allowed access to the Nagasaki port. Id. The Dutch even maintained a 
colony on Deshima Island in Nagasaki harbor. Id. at 32. Thus, the Japanese were not entirely isolated 
from the rest of the world. Id. at 31–32. 
 21. Id. at 33. Commodore Matthew Perry led the squadron and was accompanied by a letter 
written from President Millard Fillmore to the Emperor of Japan. Id. President Fillmore’s letter stated 
that “the United States and Japan ‘should live in friendship and have commercial intercourse with each 
other.’” Id. (citing President Fillmore’s Letter, in F.C. JONES, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN AND 
THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS RESULTING IN ITS ABOLITION 1853–1899, at 6 (1970)). Specifically, the 
letter requested “the right to buy coal for steamers on the passage between California and China; 
proper protection for shipwrecked sailors; and permission for ships to dispose of cargo at one or more 
Japanese ports of call.” Id. at 32–33. Although Perry never threatened the Japanese with the use of 
force if they did not accede to President Fillmore’s request, his behavior made it clear that the United 
States intended Japan to open, with or without Japan’s cooperation. See W.G Beasley, The Foreign 
Threat and the Opening of the Ports, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN VOLUME 5: THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 259, 269–70 (Marius B. Jansen ed., 1989). See also ANAND, supra note 3, at 
33–35. 
 Several weeks after Perry’s arrival, Russian ships appeared at Nagasaki. See Beasley, supra. The 
Russians had heard about the American plans to send ships to Japan and were determined that Russia 
should not be excluded from any openings in Japan forged by the Americans. Id. 
 22. ANAND, supra note 3, at 34. The treaty opened two ports to American ships, promised refuge 
for shipwrecked sailors, allowed U.S. merchants purchasing power at the ports, allowed for an 
American consul in Japan, and contained a most-favored-nation clause promising the United States the 
same benefits as were given to any other countries in future treaties. Id. 
 23. Id. “Although [the treaty] was not in the full sense a commercial treaty, it was the beginning 
and, as Perry said in his report, Japan was ‘opened to the nations of the west.’” Id. (quoting Beasley, 
supra note 21, at 270). 
 24. Id. The British treaty allowed the British to use two Japanese ports for repairs and refilling 
supplies. Id. Unlike the American treaty, the British-Japan treaty did not mention trading. Id. However, 
it did include a similar most-favored-nation clause. Id. 
 25. Id. at 35. The Russian treaty allowed use of several ports, gave trading and consul rights, and 
gave the Russian consul jurisdiction over Russians residing in Japan. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. See Beasley, supra note 21, at 275–77. For a comprehensive list of the general changes that 
the Japanese allowed under these agreements, see id. at 277. 
 28. ANAND, supra note 3, at 35–36. The convention “opened Nagasaki to the United States, 
provided for full diplomatic and consular privileges, permanent residence of Americans at Shimoda 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/7
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the two countries signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce,29 which 
included even more privileges for the Americans.30 Once again, other 
countries followed suit, either by renegotiating existing treaties31 or 
initiating first-time treaties.32  
Anti-foreign sentiment rose in Japan’s cities out of a perception that the 
terms of the treaties were unequal and the fear that Japan would, like 
China, find itself in a position subordinate to the West.33 In 1863, the 
Emperor of Japan ordered the expulsion of all foreigners.34 When the 
Japanese opened fire on foreign ships in Shimonoseki, the British, Dutch, 
French, and American response demonstrated their clearly superior 
military capabilities.35 Expelling the foreigners was no longer an option.36 
By 1870, after a short civil war precipitated in part by Japan’s inability to 
protect itself from the Western “barbarians,” Japan’s military dictatorship 
fell.37 The new Meiji rulers did not impose an isolationist policy: Japan 
was now open.38 
R.P. Anand describes this time as “a period of utter humiliation for the 
Japanese. . . . It was argued that only through unification of the country 
under the leadership of the Emperor could Japan rebuild her strength to 
repel the Western powers.”39 That the Western powers usurped privileges 
and Hakodate, permitted the appointment of an American Vice-Consul at Hakodate, private import and 
export transactions, subject to an agreed tariff, and freedom of religion and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.” Id.  
 29. For details of the United States’ dealings with the Japanese, ultimately leading up to the 
signing of the Treaty, see Beasley, supra note 21, at 277–84. 
 30. ANAND, supra note 3, at 36. These further privileges, among other things, imposed the 
United States as an intermediary between Japan and Europe in the event of conflict, and gave the U.S. 
the option to revise the treaty after 1872 and the right to circulate its currency in Japan. Id. 
 31. Id. Countries renegotiating existing treaties included France, Russia, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands. Id. 
 32. Id. Countries initiating treaties with Japan and including provisions similar to the terms in the 
American treaty include Peru, Spain, Norway, Portugal, Prussia, Sweden, Hawaii, and Austria-
Hungary. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 37. 
 35. Id. at 37–38. See also Beasley, supra note 21, at 292–97. 
 36. ANAND, supra note 3, at 38. 
 37. Id. Internally, famine weakened the Tokugawa’s power during the Tempō period (1830–
1844). See Marius B. Jansen, The Meiji Restoration, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN VOLUME 
5: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 308, 309 (Marius B. Jansen ed., 1989). Their inability to resist making 
concessions to the foreigners weakened their power further. ANAND, supra note 3, at 38. For a detailed 
telling of the troubles during this period, see Harold Bolitho, The Tempō Crisis, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF JAPAN VOLUME 5: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 116, 116–64 (Marius B. Jansen ed., 
1989). See also CONRAD TOTMAN, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 289–92 (2000); Jansen, The Meiji 
Restoration, supra, at 357–59. 
 38. ANAND, supra note 3, at 38.  
 39. Id.  
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not included in their respective treaties added to the sense of humiliation.40 
Resentment at the unequal treatment in these treaties ran high in Japan, 
and a deepening sense of racial inferiority only strengthened the sense of 
injustice.41 Despite such resentment, the Japanese began assimilating all 
things Western into their culture, out of the belief that only by being 
perceived as equals to the Westerners could they be treated as such.42 
Japan soon began expanding in the same fashion as the Western powers,43 
characterizing their own imperialism as the civilizing of barbarians.44 
More humiliation at the hands of Western powers was not long in 
coming: When Japan invaded China in 1895, Russia, France, and 
Germany responded by threatening military intervention if Japan did not 
return a portion of its conquered territory to the Chinese and slow its 
expanse.45 Angry at such patronizing meddling, the Japanese concluded 
that, in the end, only force mattered in international relations. Indeed, as 
one Japanese historian has pointed out, in order to understand the Japanese 
nationalism in the twentieth century it is important to comprehend the 
bitterness and sense of humiliation that swept the country in the wake of 
western intervention.46 
Despite this setback, Japan was rapidly gaining ground in international 
stature.47 At the conclusion of a 1904 war with Russia, Japan had emerged 
as the first non-Western great power.48 
 40. Id. at 38–39.  
 41. Id. at 39. 
 42. Id. at 40–48. See also Hirakawa Sukehiro, Japan’s Turn to the West (Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi trans.), in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN VOLUME 5: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
432 (Marius B. Jansen ed., 1989). 
 43. ANAND, supra note 3, at 48–49. Between 1875 and 1891, Japan annexed Kuriles, the Bonin 
Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Volcano Islands. Id. In the 1870s, Japan dealt with Korea much as 
Commodore Matthew Perry had dealt with Japan twenty years earlier. Id. at 49. See also supra note 21 
and accompanying text. In 1894, Japan declared war on China, and by 1895 had forced China out of 
Korea and Taiwan, extracted important trading rights from the Chinese, and established itself as a 
regional superpower. Id. at 49–50. 
 44. Id. at 50. 
 45. Id. at 56. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 58–61. First, Japan helped suppress the Boxer Uprising in an alliance with the Western 
Powers. Id. at 58. As a result, Japan was subsequently invited to a peace conference as a full member 
and thereafter was one of the “Boxer protocol powers.” Id. Japan also became Britain’s principle ally 
in the region. Id. 
 48. Id. at 60. Japan wanted to push Russia out of its growing regional sphere of influence and 
secure its place as local hegemon. Id. at 58–62. The Japanese believed that conflict between Russia 
and Japan in the Korean peninsula would continue until one of the two retreated. Id. at 59 (“[T]he 
Russo-Japanese war was essentially an imperialistic war, fought between two powers over issues 
outside their national boundaries, at the expense of Korea and China who had no say in the matter.”). 
 Japan and Russia signed the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905. Id. For the stipulations 
of the treaty, see id. at 59–60. For a description of Japan’s expanded sphere of influence, see id. at 58–
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/7
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When armed conflict began in 1914, Japan recognized that by joining 
the Allies, it could easily and legitimately expand its influence by 
conquering Germany’s nearby Pacific territories.49 At a meeting of the 
League of Nations, Japan announced a “Japanese Monroe Doctrine.”50 
Indeed, Japan began to view East Asia as one unit with a uniquely 
Japanese identity,51 envisioning what it called the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere.52 During this same period, Japan initiated a full-scale 
war against China, which lasted until 1945.53 On September 27, 1940, 
Japan signed the Tripartite Alliance with Germany and Italy and became a 
62. See also ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY 243 illus. 2 (Geoffrey Barraclough & Richard Overy eds., 
Hammond 5th ed. 1999) (1978) (showing Japanese expansion from 1875–1918). 
 49. ANAND, supra note 3, at 64. Japan ousted the Germans from their colony in the Chinese 
province of Tsingtao as well as from their colonies in Micronesia. Id. During World War I, Japan 
signed a treaty with China that reflected its “Twenty-one Demands” and sent troops to Siberia, which 
remained in Russia after the other allies left. Id. at 65–66. In the interim between its success against 
Russia in 1905 and the beginning of World War I in 1914, Japan turned its focus to exploiting its 
Taiwanese and Korean colonies in much the same manner as had the Western powers with their own 
colonies the previous century. Id. at 62–63. For a discussion of why Japan’s empire was, despite its 
patterning on Western practices, quite unique, see Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 
1895–1945, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN VOLUME 6: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 217, 217–
23 (Peter Duus ed., 1988). Peattie suggests that the Japanese colonial model was based on two 
precepts. Id. at 238. The first was an emphasis on racial superiority whereby it was “the moral right of 
‘superior’ races to dominate and guide the destinies of ‘lesser’ people.” Id. The second precept was 
one of total assimilation “aimed at eliminating all differences between the colonies and the 
motherland.” Id. at 240. Peattie notes that although the assimilation doctrine might not have been 
tyrannical in theory, it ended up very coercive in nature. Id. at 243. For instance, Japan’s domination 
of Korea in particular was so repressive it has been described as “colonial totalitarianism.” Id. (quoting 
GREGORY HENDERSON, KOREA: POLITICS OF THE VORTEX 146–56 (1966)). Undertaking a project of 
“Japanization,” the Japanese made a concerted effort to wipe out any sense of Korean identity. 
ANAND, supra note 3, at 63. 
 50. ANAND, supra note 3, at 67–70. The actual Monroe Doctrine enunciated “[t]he principle that 
the United States will allow no intervention or domination by any non-American nation in the Western 
Hemisphere.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (8th ed. 2004). Recognition of a Japanese Monroe 
Doctrine would have provided international legitimacy to Japanese imperialism: the League of Nations 
Covenant states, “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international 
engagements such as . . . regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the 
maintenance of peace.” THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 21, in ALFRED ZIMMERN, 
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918–1925, at 508 (1936). 
 51. Peattie, supra note 49, at 243. In fact, “all references to colonies were eliminated in favor of a 
distinction only between the ‘inner territory’—Japan—and the ‘outer territories’—the overseas 
possessions.” Id.  
 52. ANAND, supra note 3, at 74. Believing in a uniquely Asian identity, which corresponded 
precisely to a uniquely Japanese identity, Japan set out to liberate the Asian race from Western 
influences and colonialism. Peattie, supra note 49, at 243–44. After a failed assassination attempt in 
1928 that might have resulted in Japanese control of Chinese-held Manchuria, Japan launched an overt 
offensive in Manchuria in September 1931. ANAND, supra note 3, at 72–73. By March 1932, Japan 
completely occupied and controlled Manchuria. Id. at 73. By 1935, Japan had invaded not only North 
China and Inner Mongolia, but mainland China as well. Id. at 75. Japan was aiming for total control of 
China. Id.  
 53. ANAND, supra note 3, at 76–80.  
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member of the Axis Powers.54 By the summer of 1941, Japan occupied 
both northern and southern Indochina.55 On December 8, 1941, Japan 
launched its attack on Pearl Harbor, officially drawing the United States 
into World War II.56 
Japan continued its offensive until 1945.57 After relentlessly carpet-
bombing Japanese cities for five months,58 American forces dropped an 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.59 Another atomic attack 
followed on Nagasaki on August 9.60 The Japanese surrendered on August 
15, 1945.61 Allied occupation of Japan began shortly thereafter, under the 
auspices of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Pacific (“SCAP”), 
General Douglas MacArthur.62 
 54. Tripartite Alliance Pact, F.R.G.-Italy-Japan, Sept. 27, 1940, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PEACE 
AND WAR: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931–1941, at 573 (1943). Article I of the Tripartite 
Alliance Pact states that “Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the 
establishment of a new order in Europe.” Id. Article 2 states that “Germany and Italy recognize and 
respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.” Id. at 574. 
See also ANAND, supra note 3, at 77. Japan entered into the Tripartite Alliance Pact because it 
believed that “Chinese military resistance was kept alive by military and psychological assistance from 
the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and France.” Id. at 76–77. 
 55. ANAND, supra note 3, at 77. This expansion into Indochina came as the German offensive 
distracted and weakened the Western powers. Id. Alarmed, the United States requested that Japan 
withdraw completely from China and Indochina in November 1941. Id. at 77–78. Japan refused. Id. at 
78. 
 56. Id. A note on the dates: in Japan, it was December 8; in the United States, it was still 
December 7. On the same day, Japan issued its Imperial Proclamation of War, in which it declared a 
“Greater Asian War.” Id. at 78–79. See also President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress 
(Dec. 8, 1941), in 5 DEP’T ST. BULL., Dec. 8, 1941, at 474, reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
PEACE AND WAR: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931–1941, at 267 (1943). 
 57. ANAND, supra note 3, at 79–80. For a detailed history of Japan’s march through the Pacific 
and the Allied response until Japan’s surrender in 1945, see generally DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, 
REMINISCENCES 77–266 (1964); ROEHRS & RENZI, supra note †, at 67–255; Alvin D. Coox, The 
Pacific War, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN VOLUME 6: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 51, 345–
76 (Peter Duus ed., 1988). See also ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY, supra note 48, at 268–69 illus. 2–3 
(depicting the Japanese offensive and the Allied response). 
 58. THOMAS W. ZEILER, UNCONDITIONAL DEFEAT 150–51 (2004). 
 59. Id. at 184–85. The overwhelming devastation wrought by American forces was a response to 
Japanese fanaticism even in the face of destruction and human loss on a scale previously 
unimaginable. Id. at 2. As Zeiler notes, “If [Japan] would not stop fighting on its own and surrender—
the logical, rational choice, owing to the vast disparity in power between the two nations—then the 
United States would force it to do so. . . .” Id. To understand the horrors seen by both sides, see id. at 
22–23, 48–49, 150–51, 160. 
 60. Id. at 185–86. 
 61. Id. at 189. The terms of surrender and subsequent occupation were dictated by the Potsdam 
Declaration. ANAND, supra note 3, at 80–81. The Potsdam Declaration was signed by the United 
States, Britain, and China on July 26, 1945. Potsdam Declaration, supra note 3, at 175–76. 
 62. See generally MACARTHUR, supra note 57, at 269–324 (MacArthur’s story of the occupation 
of Japan). 
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2. The Allied Occupation and Constitutional Revision: Creating a 
Peace State 
The Potsdam Declaration called for “the eliminat[ion] for all time the 
authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people 
of Japan into embarking on world conquest,”63 the destruction of Japan’s 
war-making power,64 and demanded that the “Japanese government . . . 
remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic 
tendencies among the Japanese people.”65 Japan was to be occupied until 
these objectives were met.66 In order to meet these mandates, the Japanese 
needed a new government with a different constitutional structure.67 
Japan’s 1947 Constitution was not, in fact, a wholly new constitution, but 
a revision of the Meiji Constitution of 1889.68 General MacArthur 
suggested the revision in October 1945.69 The revised Constitution was to 
 63. Potsdam Declaration ¶¶ 6–7, supra note 3, at 175–76. 
 64. Id. ¶ 7. 
 65. Id. ¶ 10. 
 66. Id. ¶ 12. 
 67. ANAND, supra note 3, at 84. 
 68. Lawrence W. Beer, Japan’s Constitutional System and Its Judicial Interpretation, in LAW 
AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 8 (John O. Haley ed., 1988). 
Additionally, the 1947 Constitution has never been amended. ANAND, supra note 3, at 85. For an 
analysis of why it was important to “revise” the constitution rather than create a new one, see KOSEKI 
SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 92–94 (Ray A. Moore trans., Westview 
Press 1997) (1989). For a general comparison of the features of the Meiji Constitution with the those 
of the revised 1947 Constitution, see John M. Maki, Japanese Constitutional Style, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947–1967, at 3–8 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 
1968). 
 69. KOSEKI, supra note 68, at 7–9. MacArthur told a Japanese minister that “‘the Japanese 
Constitution must be revised. It is essential to introduce into government sufficient liberal elements 
through constitutional revision.’” Id. at 9 (internal citation omitted). Douglas made the suggestion for 
revision on October 4, 1945, during a meeting with three-time pre-war prime minister and then-
minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro. Id. at 8. MacArthur’s statement about the necessity of constitutional 
revision came as a response to Konoe, after delivering a monologue about the causes of the war, id. at 
8–9, asking MacArthur “‘whether [he had] any ideas or suggestions regarding the organization of the 
Japanese Government and the composition of the Diet.’” Id. at 9.  
 Interestingly, whether MacArthur demanded constitutional revision became the source of 
controversy. Id. at 9. George Atcheson, Jr., political advisor to the Supreme Commander and present at 
the October 4 meeting, id. at 8, later wrote to President Truman that a seemingly clear mandate for 
constitutional reform had actually been the result of a translator’s error. Id. at 18–19. Atcheson wrote, 
“[MacArthur] mentioned that the ‘administrative machinery’ of the Government should be reformed 
and Konoe’s interpreter . . . could not think of the correct Japanese translation and passed the 
statement off . . . with the only thing that came to his mind—’the constitution should be revised.’” Id. 
at 19 (quoting Letter from George Atcheson, The Acting Political Advisor in Japan to President 
Truman (Nov. 5, 1945)). Koseki calls this “a dishonorable and shockingly false charge against the 
interpreter,” and explains that Atcheson’s story may have been an attempt to correct perceptions that 
the constitutional reform had not come from within Japan but at the direction of the American 
occupiers. Id. at 19. See also id. at 1–19. MacArthur would maintain in his memoirs, however, that 
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conform to MacArthur’s Three Principles: retention of the Emperor as the 
head of state, renunciation of the right of war, and the abolishment of the 
feudal system.70 
Although MacArthur’s Three Principles clearly stated that Japan must 
abolish the right of war, confusion surrounds the exact origins of Article 
9.71 MacArthur testified to the United States Senate in 1951, and later 
repeated in his autobiography, that Prime Minister Shidehara authored the 
provision.72 Others have described Article 9 as the result of MacArthur’s 
personal edict.73 Whatever its origin, the language of Article 9 was 
originally placed in the preamble to the Constitution.74 The text of the 
although he recognized the need for constitutional change, he did not try to impose a constitution on 
the Japanese, instead stating that “[t]he revision had to be made by the Japanese themselves and it had 
to be done without coercion.” MACARTHUR, supra note 57, at 299. MacArthur particularly refuted the 
idea that Article 9 was foisted upon the Japanese at his insistence, stating that the idea came from 
Prime Minister Shidehara. Id. at 302–03. 
 70. KOSEKI, supra note 68, at 79. As to the second point of the Three Principles, the right to war, 
MacArthur wrote: 
2. War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality 
for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher 
ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. 
No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency 
will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. 
Id. 
 71. Id. at 82–86. 
 72. Id. at 83. See also MACARTHUR, supra note 57, at 303. MacArthur stated that the idea of 
including the no-war principle came from Shidehara and that Shidehara wanted to prohibit “any 
military establishment whatsoever” for Japan. Id. MacArthur wrote of his reaction: 
I had thought that my long years of experience had rendered me practically immune to 
surprise or unusual excitement, but this took my breath away. I could not have agreed more. 
For years I have believed that war should be abolished as an outmoded means of resolving 
disputes between nations.  
Id. He quotes Shidehara as saying, “‘The world will laugh and mock us as impracticable visionaries, 
but a hundred years from now we will be called prophets.’” Id. (citation omitted). MacArthur was 
pleased that this renunciation of war—a requirement of the Potsdam Declaration—“had been 
accomplished by the Japanese themselves, not by the conquering powers.” Id. at 304. Koseki 
concludes, MacArthur’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding, that MacArthur himself proposed 
Article 9.  KOSEKI, supra note 68, at 85. Koseki seems to adopt the view of Professor Sodei Rinjiro 
that MacArthur may have been trying to avoid the apparent hypocrisy behind authoring such a 
provision and shortly thereafter initiating the Korean War. Id. at 85–86.  
 73. MACARTHUR, supra note 57, at 302 (“It has frequently been charged, even by those who 
should be better informed, that the ‘no war’ clause was forced upon the government by my personal 
fiat.”). 
 74. KOSEKI, supra note 68, at 83. Paragraph 1 of Article 9’s language is similar to that of both the 
1928 Kellog-Briand Pact, and Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. ANAND, supra note 3, at 
105–06. Compare Article 9, supra note 1, with General Pact for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 
1928, in DEP’T OF STATE, THE GENERAL PACT FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR 1–3 (1928) (“The 
High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of 
national policy in their relations with one another”), and U.N. CHARTER art. 2 (“All Members shall 
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Article was later incorporated into the body of the Constitution at 
MacArthur’s suggestion.75  
On April 17, 1946 a complete draft of the Constitution was published 
in colloquial Japanese.76 The draft was submitted for consideration by the 
Japanese Diet’s House of Representatives on June 25, 1946 and 
promulgated on November 3, 1946.77 The Constitution officially took 
effect on May 3, 1947.78 
3. From “No Self-Defense Allowed” to “Peacekeeping Operations” 
Despite struggles later in the century to justify self-defense, it is clear 
that the original understanding of Article 9 was that it did not allow Japan 
to defend itself even against an aggressor’s attack.79 However, with the 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”).  
 Theodore McNelly notes that it is not Paragraph One of Article 9 that makes it unique. MCNELLY, 
supra note 3, at 105–06. After all, several French constitutions renounced war beginning in 1791. Id. 
German, Brazilian and Costa Rican constitutions have also renounced war. See Grundgesetz [GG] 
[Constitution] art. 26 (F.R.G.); Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Federal Constitution] art. 4 (Braz.); 
Constitución Política [Constitution] art. 12 (Costa Rica). Costa Rica abolished its army, similarly to 
Japan, but retained a constitutionally sanctioned police force. Id. art. 12. MCNELLY, supra note 3, at 
106.  
 What makes the Japanese constitution particularly unique is its renunciation of defensive 
capabilities and prohibition of any military forces in paragraph two of Article 9. Id. As Dupont notes, 
No other country in the world explicitly renounces war as a sovereign right; or eschews the 
threat, or use of force, as a means of settling international disputes; or proscribes land, sea and 
air forces as well as other war potential. This . . . is all the more remarkable when one 
considers that Japan is not an Asian Costa Rica but the world’s second largest economy, a 
major financial power and a favoured candidate for a permanent seat on an expanded United 
Nation’s Security Council. 
DUPONT, supra note 11, at xxi (footnote omitted). 
 75. KOSEKI, supra note 68, at 83. When it was first moved, the renunciation of war text was 
originally placed as Article 1. Id. In the final version of the SCAP draft, the renunciation text was 
placed in a separate chapter, “Chapter Two, Renunciation of War.” Id. It was placed after the 
description of the Emperor’s power in deference to the importance of the Emperor to the Japanese 
people. Id. at 84. 
 76. Id. at 133. 
 77. Id. at 169. During this process, the draft constitution underwent examination by the Privy 
Council, the Special Committee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution, another specially created 
House of Representatives subcommittee, the House of Peers, and again by the Privy Council. Id. at 
168–69. 
 78. Id. at 220. 
 79. Id. at 192–93. During a meeting of the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Yoshida 
stated that “‘the very recognition [of the right to go to war in self-defense] is harmful.’” Id. at 193 
(citation omitted). Likewise, the Privy Council had prepared a “Collection of Expected Questions and 
Answers,” in which it stated that Japan could not go to war in self-defense. Id. at 192–93. Until 1954, 
Yoshida’s statement was the official interpretation of Article 9 and the official answer to the question 
of legitimate self-defense. Id. at 193. 
 Later, the primary writer of Article 9 would characterize self-defense as a type of inherent residual 
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outbreak of the Korean War in 1950,80 the United States needed to secure 
Japan’s involvement in the containment of communism and was therefore 
willing to condone such activity in the shadow of Article 9.81  
In August 1950, SCAP ordered Japan to establish a National Police 
Reserve.82 A year later, Japan and the United States signed a bilateral 
mutual security treaty.83 The National Police Reserve became the National 
Safety Forces (NSF), and, in 1952, Japan established the National Safety 
Agency to manage the Safety Forces.84 By 1955, Japan had established 
ground, maritime, and air Self-Defense Forces.85 On January 19, 1960, 
Japan and the United States signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security,86 which remains in effect today. Supplementing the Treaty of 
right that all nations had, whether or not they availed themselves of it. Id. at 194. While Article 9 
disavowed aggressive war, it had nothing to say about self-defense. Id. The official interpretation 
taught in Japanese law schools was that “Japan had the right to self-defense under international law, 
but had waived it under the language of the second paragraph” of Article 9. Robert A. Fisher, Note, 
The Erosion of Japanese Pacifism: The Constitutionality of the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, 
32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 393, 398 (1999). For the views expressed by Japan’s Commission on the 
Constitution, which met from 1957–1964 to examine the implications of Japan’s 1947 Constitution, on 
whether Article 9 allowed for self-defense, see JAPAN’S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
FINAL REPORT 260–69 (John M. Maki ed., trans., Univ. of Wash. Press 1980). 
 It is worth noting that General MacArthur maintained that “Nothing in Article 9 . . . prevents any 
and all necessary steps for the preservation of the safety of the nation. . . . If attacked, she will defend 
herself.” MACARTHUR, supra note 57, at 304. 
 80. Haruhiro Fukui, Postwar Politics, 1945–1973, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 
VOLUME 6: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 154, 158 (Peter Duus ed., 1988). For a history of the outbreak 
and course of the Korean War, see JAMES BRADY, THE COLDEST WAR: A MEMOIR OF KOREA (2000); 
T.R. FEHRENBACH, THIS KIND OF WAR: THE CLASSIC KOREAN WAR HISTORY (1998); CARTER 
MALKASIAN, THE KOREAN WAR 1950–1953 (2001). 
 81. Fukui, supra note 80, at 158. 
 82. Id. Japan was left virtually undefended because of the transfer of SCAP forces to Korea. 
Edward J.L. Southgate, Comment, From Japan to Afghanistan: The U.S.-Japan Joint Security 
Relationship, the War on Terror, and the Ignominious End of the Pacifist State?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1599, 1612–13 (2003). In order to preserve security, MacArthur ordered the creation of the National 
Police Reserve. Id. at 1612. 
 83. Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, 
3 U.S.T. 3329; see also GEORGE R. PACKARD III, PROTEST IN TOKYO: THE SECURITY TREATY CRISIS 
OF 1960, at 355–57 (1966); Fukui, supra note 80, at 158. Under the treaty, the United States is 
obligated to defend Japan in exchange for Japan allowing U.S. bases on its soil. See Sandra Madsen, 
Note, The Japanese Constitution and Self-Defense Forces: Prospects for a New Japanese Military 
Role, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 549, 559 (1993). 
 84. James E. Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation of War, JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74 
(Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). The National Safety Agency became the 
Defense Agency in 1954. Id. at 75. 
 85. Id. at 76. 
 86. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.–Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; 
Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security: Facilities and Areas 
and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.–Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1653. See 
also UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 1–5, 13–36 (American 
Embassy 1968). The treaty increased Japan’s advisory control over United States troops stationed on 
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Mutual Cooperation and Security are the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation.87 
Since signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan 
has become involved in international peacekeeping operations and 
humanitarian missions, at first slowly, but more rapidly in the past few 
years.88 From a meager police force evolved a fully functioning de facto 
modern military.89 
The first Persian Gulf war focused the world’s attention on Japan’s 
participation in international peacekeeping90 when it contributed more than 
$13 billion to the effort in 1990.91 Despite having made the third largest 
financial contribution to the war,92 Japan was widely criticized for its 
refusal to contribute troops and was accused of “checkbook diplomacy.”93 
In 1990, a United Nations (UN) Peace Cooperation Bill that would have 
sent SDF forces to the Persian Gulf failed to pass muster in the Diet.94 In 
1992, however, the Diet passed a different Peace Cooperation Bill 
allowing SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations, but 
prohibiting the SDF from using force.95 
its soil and requires that Japan support the United States if the U.S. is attacked in Japanese territory. 
See Madsen, supra note 83. 
 87. Joint Statement on Review of Defense Cooperation Guidelines and Defense Cooperation, 
U.S.-Japan, Sept. 23, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1621–38; The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, U.S.-
Japan, Apr. 17, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1001–05. See also Matthew J. Gilley, Comment, Japan’s Developing 
Military Potential Within the Context of Its Constitutional Renunciation of War, 14 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 1681, 1707–16 (2000). 
 88. See Ted McKenna, Post 9-11, Japan Gets More Militant, 28 J. ELECTRONIC DEFENSE 33 
(2005). Cf. JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SITUATION DEFENSE 3 (2003), 
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005). See also DUPONT, supra note 11, at 4 
tbl.1.1 (SDF peacekeeping activities 1992–2004). The Self-Defense Forces have been deployed to 
Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Syria, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Id. 
 89. Cf. JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY, supra note 88, at 11. See also DUPONT, supra note 11, at 26 
(describing the SDF in its early stage as “lack[ing] operational teeth or a strong public mandate” and 
documenting changes in the SDF that have made them more capable). See also id. at 27 tbl.3.1–3.2 
(comparing Japan’s air and naval capabilities against other countries’ capabilities). 
 90. See Madsen, supra note 83. 
 91. Auer, supra note 84, at 78. This was not the first time the SDF had been deployed outside of 
Japan: minesweepers were sent to Korea in 1950. Id. at 79. 
 92. Id. at 78. 
 93. See Derek van Hoften, Note, Declaring War on the Japanese Constitution: Japan’s Right to 
Military Sovereignty and the United States’ Right to Military Presence in Japan, 26 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 289, 298 (2003). 
 94. Robert B. Funk, Note, Japan’s Constitution and U.N. Obligations in the Persian Gulf War: A 
Case for Non-Military Participation in U.N. Enforcement Actions, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 363, 385–
89 (1992). 
 95. Auer, supra note 84, at 79. The law also stipulated that the SDF were not to enter combat 
zones and could not go to locations where a peace agreement had not yet been reached. Id. at 79–80. 
Another 1992 bill, The International Emergency Rescue Force Law, allowed the SDF to participate in 
aiding other countries in the event of a natural disaster. Id. at 80. 
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B. Domestic Interpretation of Article 9: The Role of the Japanese 
Judiciary 
Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution provides for Supreme Court 
review of the “constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official 
act.”96 Although there have been three major cases interpreting Article 9, 
the Supreme Court of Japan generally has resorted to an American-like 
political question doctrine97 when dealing with Article 9 adjudication.98  
First, in the 1959 Sunakawa case a group of Japanese radicals broke 
into an air base used by the United States and subsequently raised the 
defense that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was unconstitutional.99 The 
Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of war for self-
defense or of the SDF.100 The Court did, however, hold that Japan retained 
an inherent right to self-defense.101 
Second, in the Naganuma Nike Missile Site Cases,102 local residents 
sued the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in 1973 in the 
 96. NIHONKOKU KEMPŌ art. 81 (Japan), supra note 1, at app. at 312. See also Yasuhiro 
Okudaira, The Constitution and Its Various Influences, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra 
note 84, at 16–17. Under the Meiji Constitution, there was no judicial review of government acts. 
Kisaburo Yokota, Political Questions and Judicial Review: A Comparison, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
JAPAN, supra note 1, at 141. 
 97. The American political question doctrine originated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803). The Supreme Court more fully explicated the factors determining what 
constitutes a political question in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  
 98. Yakota, supra note 96, at 142. See also Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of 
Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3, 43–45 (1996); David 
Boling, Note, Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews 
International Legal Responsibility?, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 533, 553, 577–80 (1995); but see 
Taisuke Kamata, Adjudication and the Governing Process, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra 
note 84, at 151–57 (noting that lately the Supreme Court has applied the legislative discretion doctrine 
in lieu of the political question, despite having utilized the political question doctrine in past cases); 
Funk, supra note 94, at 380–83. For an examination of Japan’s constitutional borrowing generally, see 
Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional Borrowing and Political Theory, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 224 (2003). 
Additionally, Matthew J. Gilley examines how contemporary Japanese courts have imported a 
positivist tradition from the previous constitution and thus have limited their interpretative 
independence in adjudicating Article 9 disputes. See Matthew J. Gilley, Comment, Japan’s 
Developing Military Potential Within the Context of Its Constitutional Renunciation of War, 14 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1681, 1687–93, 1703, 1716 (2000). 
 99. Sakata v. Japan (The Sunakawa Case), 13 KEISHŪ 3225 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1959), translated 
in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 298–365 (J.M. Maki Trans., 1964) 
[hereinafter MAKI, Sunakawa]; Auer, supra note 84, at 80. 
 100. MAKI, Sunakawa, supra note 99, at 302–08. See also Auer, supra note 84, at 80. 
 101. MAKI, Sunakawa, supra note 99, at 302–08. See also Auer, supra note 84, at 80. 
 102. See Uno v. Minister of Agric., Forestry, and Fisheries (The Naganuma Nike Missile Site 
Case III), 36 MINSHŪ 9, 1679 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 1982), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI 
ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970–1990, at 83–130 (Malcom D.H. Smith & 
Masako Kamiya trans.) (1996) [hereinafter BEER, Naganuma III]; Minister of Agric., Forestry and 
Fisheries v. Ito (The Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case II), 27 GYŌSAI REISHŪ 8, 1175 (Sapporo High 
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Sapporo District Court to prevent a missile base from being constructed in 
a forest reserve near Naganuma in Hokkaido.103 The residents argued, 
among other things, that construction of the base would violate Article 
9.104 The District Court, after concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to 
sue105 and that the political question doctrine did not apply,106 held that the 
SDF was unconstitutional.107 Three years later, in 1976, the Sapporo High 
Court reversed and vacated the Sapporo District Court decision on the 
grounds of non-justiciability because, the High Court said, the appellees 
had lost their interest in the suit.108 Despite having disposed of the case 
with the standing determination, the High Court went on to examine the 
meaning of Article 9 and the constitutionality of the SDF.109 The High 
Court determined that, while Article 9’s first paragraph clearly renounced 
war, the effect of the second paragraph was unclear.110 The Court 
concluded by stating that the constitutionality of the SDF was ultimately a 
political judgment not to be determined by courts.111 The Supreme Court 
Ct., Aug. 5, 1976), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE 
LAW OF JAPAN, 1970–1990, at 83–130 (Malcom D.H. Smith & Masako Kamiya trans.) (1996) 
[hereinafter BEER, Naganuma II]; Ito v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (The 
Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case I), 712 HANREI JIHÓ 24 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973), 
translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 
1970–1990, at 83–130 (Malcom D.H. Smith & Masako Kamiya trans.) (1996) (decision of the 
Sapporo District Court) [hereinafter BEER, Naganuma I]. See also Auer, supra note 84, at 80–81. 
 103. See BEER, Naganuma I, supra note 102, at 83. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 85–88. 
 106. See id. at 91–94. 
 107. See id. at 111–12. The Sapporo District Court stated: 
Viewed in terms of its organization, scale, equipment and capabilities, the SDF is a military 
force, since it is clearly “an organization of men and material which has as its purpose combat 
activity involving physical force against a foreign threat.” Accordingly, the Ground, 
Maritime, and Air SDF correspond to the “war potential” of “land, sea, and air forces,” 
maintenance of which is forbidden by Article 9 . . . .  
Id. at 111. 
 108. See BEER, Naganuma II, supra note 102, at 114. See generally id. at 112–22. 
 109. Id. at 114–22. After determining that the “right to live in peace, as stated in the Preamble” to 
the Constitution did not confer substantive rights but was a statement of an ideal or goal, id. at 113–14 
(citation omitted), the High Court stated that the establishment of the SDF and the enactment of other 
laws dealing with the SDF fell under the political question doctrine unless “recognized at first sight as 
very clearly unconstitutional or illegal.” Id. at 118. For the High Court’s discussion of Article 81 and 
how far judicial review might extend, see id. at 115–18. 
 110. Id. at 118–19. The High Court stated that “there [were] positive and negative theories as to 
whether or not the maintenance of military forces and other war potential for the purpose of self-
defense [were] forbidden.” Id. at 119. The High Court examined these positive and negative theories, 
id. at 119–21, and then concluded that it could not “say that it [was] necessarily clear on which of 
these two views our Constitution was based.” Id. at 121. 
 111. Id. at 122. 
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affirmed the High Court’s decision, but nowhere mentioned the issue of 
Article 9 or the constitutionality of the SDF.112 
Third, in the Hyakuri Air Base Case in 1989, a dispute arose over land 
that the SDF wanted to buy in order to build a military base.113 The Mito 
District Court found for the SDF.114 Additionally, the court stated that use 
of force for self-defense was not unconstitutional under Article 9.115 
However, the court declined to reach the constitutionality of the existence 
of the SDF, describing it as a political question that should be left to the 
Diet and to the public.116 On appeal, the Tokyo High Court also found for 
the SDF.117 The Tokyo High Court did not address the constitutionality of 
self-defense generally, or of the SDF.118 In affirming the Tokyo High 
Court decision, the Supreme Court also declined to examine the 
constitutionality of self-defense or the SDF.119  
Given its history of either ignoring the constitutional question 
altogether or declining to rule on it, it is unlikely that the Japanese 
Supreme Court will influence the course of Article 9 interpretation 
through a definitive ruling.120 
 112. BEER, Naganuma III, supra note 102, at 122–30. 
 113. Ishizuka v. Japan (The Hyakuri Air Base case), 43 Minshū 6, 385 (Sup. Ct., June 20, 1989), 
translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 
1970–1990, at 83–130 (Malcom D.H. Smith & Masako Kamiya trans.) (1996) (Vicki L. Beyer & 
Hiroshi Itoh trans.) [hereinafter BEER, Hyakuri]. 
 114. BEER, Hyakuri, supra note 113, at 131. 
 115. Id. “[I]n the event of a foreign military attack upon Japan, the resort to the right of self-
defense to impede and repel invasion, as well as the prior organization and preparation of effective and 
appropriate self-defense measures, does not violate the Preamble or Article 9 of the Constitution.” Id. 
(quoting the Mito District Court). For a different translation of this paragraph, see Auer, supra note 84, 
at 81. 
 116. Auer, supra note 84, at 81. 
 117. BEER & ITOH, supra note 102, at 131. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Auer, supra note 84, at 82. 
 120. See John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and 
Fundamental Human Rights, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 84, at 41 (“It seems 
fairly safe to predict that the Supreme Court will not rule on the constitutionality of the SDF until a 
concrete legal dispute arises out of the question of whether the Government has developed the strength 
of the SDF to the point where it is clearly unconstitutional.”). See also Sylvia Brown Hamano, 
Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese Constitution and Human Rights, 
1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 443 (1999) (“[T]he Court has adopted a policy of [such] extreme deference 
to the legislative and executive branches . . . that the Japanese legal system, in effect, has returned to 
that of the Meiji period where laws dictated the content of the Constitution.”); Kendrick F. Royer, The 
Demise of the World’s First Pacifist Constitution: Japanese Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Growth of Executive Power to Make War, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 749, 767–70 (1993); Robert A. 
Fisher, Note, The Erosion of Japanese Pacifism: The Constitutionality of the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense 
Guidelines, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 393, 409 (1999) (concluding that, given the Supreme Court’s 
deference to the legislative and executive branches, the SDF is de facto constitutional). However, 
several lawsuits are pending with the Osaka, Sapporo, Tokyo, Shizuoka, and Nagoya District Courts 
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C. The Influence of Culture and Regional Politics on the Interpretation of 
Article 9 
1. Shifting Cultural Attitudes: A Generational Shift and the Emergence 
of Political Discourse in the Common Experience 
Japan’s dedication to pacifism is an important component of cultural 
identity and has been a source of considerable national pride.121 From an 
early age, the Japanese are indoctrinated with the importance of the 
pacifist Constitution.122 Japan’s ingrained aversion to war is in part a 
continued reaction to the horrors wrought by World War II and Japan’s 
blind pursuit of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.123 The destruction 
and loss of life was of a scale never imagined and the advent of the atomic 
bomb brought devastation and horror of a magnitude previously 
unthinkable.124 By August 11, when Japan sent word of its acceptance of 
the terms of surrender to Allied capitals,125 nearly three million Japanese 
military personnel and civilians had perished.126 Out of their almost utter 
annihilation in pursuit of war, the Japanese emerged a people deeply 
committed to pacifism.127 
However, a generational shift in attitude seems to be developing in 
Japan.128 While the two previous generations view pacifism as an absolute 
challenging the constitutionality of the SDF deployment to Iraq. Japanese Group Files Suit Against 
Troops Dispatch to Iraq, BBC MONITORING INT’L REP., July 28, 2004. 
 121. Beer, supra note 4, at 818–19. 
 122. See Maki, supra note 68, at 26–28. “A study of the content of the Constitution, its general 
nature, and even specific constitutional issues (notably Article 9) is a core feature of social studies, 
particularly in middle and higher schools.” Id. at 27. 
 123. Beer, supra note 4, at 818–19. See also supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 124. Id. at 185. For instance, a single March 8, 1945, bombing of Tokyo obliterated 16 square 
miles of the city, destroying 267,000 buildings, killing 83,000 people, injuring 41,000, and leaving 
more than a million homeless. ZEILER, supra note 58, at 157–58. Between March and June of 1945, 
U.S. bombing destroyed nearly fifty percent of Japan’s major cities and left twenty-two million people 
dead, injured, or homeless. Id. at 158. The battle for Okinawa alone cost nearly three thousand lives 
per day during the eighty-two-day fight. Id. at 161. When the United States finally secured Okinawa 
on June 21, 1945, 110,000 Japanese fighters had been killed along with at least 42,000 native 
Okinawans. Id. at 171–72. 
 125. ROEHRS & RENZI, supra note †, at 238. 
 126. ZEILER, supra note 58, at 193. One source places the death toll at nearly five million—one 
and a half million military dead and three million civilians dead. ROEHRS & RENZI, supra note †, at 
257.  
 127. This commitment to pacifism has also been described as war guilt. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 
1537. 
 128. See WILLIAM E. RAPP, PATHS DIVERGING? THE NEXT DECADE IN THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY 
ALLIANCE 30 (Strategic Studies Institute 2004) (“The ideological split in Japanese politics is now 
more a factor of generation than of party. In a recent poll, over 90 percent of Diet members under the 
age of 50 supported revision of the Constitution.”); Denny Roy, Stirring Samurai, Disapproving 
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mandate not to be modified, Japan’s younger citizens seem to 
overwhelmingly favor expansion of the SDF’s role as well as the revision 
of Article 9.129 Despite this shift in attitude across age groups, the Japanese 
as a whole still remain risk-averse when it comes to the potential human 
costs of war.130 Additionally, despite its attitude toward SDF expansion or 
Article 9 revision, the younger generation in Japan seems not to have a 
deep sense of attachment or devotion to its country.131  
Also important is the emergence of politics into the domain of the 
average citizen. For much of the past sixty years, there has been a 
disconnect between politics and the life of a non-politician.132 Yet this is 
Dragon: Japan’s Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations, 31 ASIAN AFFAIRS 86 (2004) 
(“[Y]ounger generations born since the end of World War II are decreasingly sympathetic to attempts 
to constrain Japan because of the ‘history issue’. . . .”). See also WILLIAM CHAPMAN, INVENTING 
JAPAN: THE MAKING OF A POSTWAR CIVILIZATION 51–55 (1991). Chapman describes the “après-
guerre generation” and its presumed break with the previous generation. Id. He notes that the après 
were only “modestly less conservative in social attitudes than [their] elders.” Id. at 52. 
 129. See DUPONT, supra note 11, at 22. A 1997 survey of Diet members found that 90% under the 
age of fifty favored revision compared to 50% of those over 50. GREEN, supra note 6, at 47. “Up to 
60% of those polled in the 20–30-year-old bracket said that the time was right for the country to 
change its constitution.” Amit Chanda, Polls Find Majority of Japanese Favouring Amendment of 
‘Peace’ Clause in Constitution, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, June 22, 2004. “[T]hose in their 20s 
supported the Iraq mission by 57% to 40%, while the ratios began to reverse themselves among people 
in their 30s and 40s.” Barbara Demick, Men in Uniform Impress Japan’s New Generation, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at A9. Additionally, “polls . . . show that a clear majority of the Japanese people 
and parliamentarians are in favour of constitutional revision . . . and nearly half (48 per cent) want to 
abandon the prohibition on collective self defence.” Id. A February 2003 poll showed 78% opposition 
to the war in Iraq. RAPP, supra note 128, at 44. Alan Dupont notes, however, that after the SDF 
deployment to Iraq, public approval of SDF involvement in Iraq rose to 53%. DUPONT, supra note 11, 
at 21; see also Howard W. French, Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2003, 
at A1 (“For the first time in three generations a shift in public opinion has rendered ordinary the 
discussion of a more assertive Japan and left defenders of the ‘peace Constitution’ on the defensive.”). 
 130. From Pacifism to Populism, THE ECONOMIST, July 10, 2004, at 20, 22 (“Japan’s overall 
foreign policy remains, at root, risk-averse.”); see also Evan Thomas & Hideko Takayama, Japan’s 
Unknown Soldiers, NEWSWEEK, July 19, 2004, at 34 (“Asked if Japan should withdraw its forces 
[from Iraq] if a soldier was killed or wounded, 54 percent [of poll respondents] said yes.”). But see 
DUPONT, supra note 11, at 21 (noting that when Japanese nationals were captured in Iraq, 61% of poll 
respondents approved of the Japanese government’s decision not to negotiate with the captors). 
 131. CHAPMAN, supra note 128, at 252. According to Chapman, in the 1980s, 
[o]lder people in a 1988 survey expressed strong feelings of patriotism; but only 20 to 30 
percent of men in their twenties acknowledged being patriotic. . . . Compared to their cohorts 
in other nations, young Japanese adults were conspicuously low in devotion to their nation. A 
survey of the Management and Coordination Agency in early 1988 measured their devotion 
to national interests against those of young adults in ten other countries. Only 5.5 percent of 
the Japanese would sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of society’s interests, a rate 
far lower than in the other nations. About 40 percent of the young Japanese expressed a 
willingness to serve their country under some circumstances. The rate was twice as high in 
the other countries. 
Id. 
 132. Id. at 145. Chapman notes: 
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changing.133 Taboos on certain political discussions have been broken,134 
and political discourse has become common amongst non-politicians.135 
D. Regional Constraints: An Uneasy Status Quo and Japan’s Image 
Problem 
Japan’s immediate regional environment might be described as one of 
barely maintained stability. Asia’s international politics have taken on a 
“hub-and-spoke structure” since World War II, with the United States as 
the central hub in a series of bilateral relationships.136 There are no strong 
multilateral institutions (such as NATO) in Asia, and tension and distrust 
among neighboring countries tends to run quite high.137 Decades of 
brinksmanship have created a sense that a descent into chaos and outright 
war are only an instant away.138 Tension also runs high in Asian 
international relations. Memories of Japan’s brutal colonization of the 
[Political scientists] found the Japanese identification with politics extremely weak. “It 
appears that many Japanese simply do not feel that politics lies within the domain of the 
average citizen,” they wrote. To put it bluntly, the average Japanese sees politics as 
something so unimportant that it can safely be left to the politicians. 
Id. (citation omitted). He further notes that “the interplay of politics and broad national issues was of 
little consequence.” Id. at 146. Chapman explains that part of this “popular detachment from politics” 
can be attributed to negative attitudes toward politicians. Id. at 146–49. Additionally, Japanese 
evaluations of self-efficacy in the political process have been historically low. Id. at 148–49. See also 
DUPONT, supra note 11, at 3: 
[T]he Japanese people were largely disengaged from the elite discourse on national 
security. . . . But the absence of informed public debate meant that there was little domestic 
pressure on Japanese politicians and bureaucrats to re-calibrate the country’s security settings 
or rethink the role of the SDF as the contours of the strategic landscape altered. Without a 
popular constituency for change, and given the political strength of the anti-military Socialist 
Party, those Japanese politicians prepared to challenge the status quo were either marginalised 
or forced to proceed with their reform agenda at a glacial pace.  
Id. 
 133. DUPONT, supra note 11, at 6–7 (“In an opinion poll conducted in October 2001, 76 per cent 
of respondents—an extremely high figure by Japanese standards—evinced an interest in defence 
issues.”). 
 134. “‘[I]t is clear to [people in Christian cultures and Western European democracies] that peace 
and freedom should be achieved at any cost, even blood. For the Japanese, the question has been 
taboo. . . . Now we are asked [that question]. We haven’t found an answer.’” CHAPMAN, supra note 
128, at 301 (quoting Kiichi Miyazawa).  
 135. Id. 
 136. Francis Fukuyama, Re-Envisioning Asia, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 76. 
 137. Id.; RAPP, supra note 128, at 2 (describing the uncertainty in the region); see also Kunihiko 
Saito, Essay, The Security Situation in East Asia and the Pacific and Japan’s Role, 19 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1835 (1996). 
 138. Cf. Aaron L. Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, in EAST 
ASIAN SECURITY 5 (Michael K. Brown et al. eds., 1996) (“[I]n the long run it is Asia that seems far 
more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict”). 
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region still remain,139 and there is a pervasive sense within the region that 
Japan has not apologized sufficiently for its actions before its 1945 
surrender to the allies.140 Japan’s neighbors view amendment of Article 9 
with suspicion and alarm, and an amendment could spark a regional arms 
race as well as push tense international relationships past the breaking 
point.141 
III. ANALYSIS 
While Japan has escaped amending Article 9 thus far, its continued 
efforts to expand SDF operations and responsibilities mean that Japan 
should come face to face with Article 9 and amend it to explicitly allow 
for self-defense, participation in peacekeeping operations, and 
humanitarian missions. Past SDF expansion came in small increments:142 
except for sending a minor minesweeping team to Korea in the 1950s,143 
Japan did not contribute personnel to aid in conflict resolution again until 
1992 when it sent eight ceasefire monitors to Cambodia.144 Since 1992, 
Japan has become increasingly involved in international affairs,145 and a 
defense ministry panel recently suggested that Japan be given first-strike 
capabilities.146 Japan has been pushing for a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council if permanent seats are added.147 Prime Minister 
 139. See generally IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF 
WORLD WAR II (1998); YUKI TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR 
II (1998); Richard John Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission Covering World War II 
Era Japanese War Crimes, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 62–70 (2003); J.N. Mak, The Asia-Pacific 
Security Order, in ASIA-PACIFIC IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 89 (Anthony McGrew & Christopher 
Brook eds., 1998) (“Japan’s assertiveness is worrying to China, South Korea and the South-East Asian 
countries which have not forgotten Japan’s expansionist policy and militarism of the 1930s and 
1940s”); Kyeyoung Park, The Unspeakable Experiences of Korean Women Under Japanese Rule, 21 
WHITTIER L. REV. 567 (2000); Harry N. Scheiber, Taking Responsibility: Moral and Historical 
Perspectives on the Japanese War-Reparations Issues, 20 BERKELY J. INT’L L. 233 (2002). 
 140. GREEN, supra note 6, at 194–98; Boling, supra note 98, at 536–37 (“Yet one need not look 
far to see why Asian nations continue to harbor ill-will against Japan. There is little evidence of 
Japanese guilt over the actions of her forces in Asia fifty years ago.”); Galvin, supra note 139, at 61, 
77–92 (“[L]ingering resentment of Japan’s war crimes still burns in China, much of Asia, and among 
many war crimes survivors as well.”). 
 141. Fukuyama, supra note 136, at 84. See also Playing with Fire, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 
2005, at 39 (noting that a recent Japanese draft law aimed at increasing patriotism in schools “risk[s] 
antagonising Japan’s neighbours and reopening deep domestic wounds.”). 
 142. Cf. RAPP, supra note 128, at 6 (“Japanese security policy will continue, inexorably, to change 
in incremental steps in the near future . . . .”). 
 143. Auer, supra note 84, at 79. 
 144. Madsen, supra note 83, at 552. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 146. David Billing, Japan Call to Reshape Defence Capabilities, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at 10. 
 147. Roy, supra note 128. Additionally, Prime Minister Koizumi has used Japan’s 2004 
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Junichiro Koizumi is well-known for his hawkish stance on what 
capabilities the SDF should have.148 Furthermore, the governing Liberal 
Democratic Party released a draft revision of the constitution in November 
2004 that would remove restrictions on the SDF and recognize it as a fully 
functioning military.149 However, for Japan to further increase its 
involvement in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions, to 
gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and to gain 
first-strike capabilities, all the while either refusing to amend Article 9 or 
attempting to justify such changes as wholly constitutional under Article 9 
threatens to undermine the significance of Article 9.150  
Japan must amend Article 9. The question then becomes one of 
immediacy. Despite Japan’s changing cultural and political landscape, this 
Note concludes that there are two sources of potential change—one 
immediate and one glacial—and that consistent with Japan’s reactive 
diplomacy and domestic incrementalism glacial change is the most likely 
future for Article 9. Thus far, amendment has been constrained by a 
variety of factors: the Supreme Court’s reticence to interfere with 
legislative determinations of Article 9’s meaning;151 the Diet’s ability to 
informally amend Article 9 through its legislative enactments;152 regional 
conflicts that have reached an uneasy status quo that might be destabilized 
should Japan choose to amend Article 9;153 and, most importantly, cultural 
attachment to pacifist sentiments.154 All of these factors will continue to 
operate as strong inhibitors of amendment. 
The two most likely sources of change are either through a shift in the 
regional security arrangement or evolving cultural sentiments. Given the 
Supreme Court’s historical deference to legislative determination and its 
declaration that it will not deem law falling under Article 9’s auspices 
unconstitutional unless it is clearly so on its face, a judicially sponsored 
deployment of 550 troops to Iraq to argue for a permanent Security Council seat, Norimitsu Onishi, 
Japan’s Troops Proceed in Iraq Without Shot Fired, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at A1, while Secretary 
of State Colin Powell expressed skepticism that Japan could fulfill the role of a permanent member 
without revising Article Nine. Id.  
 148. Cf. DUPONT, supra note 11, at xxii, 11–12. 
 149. Anthony Faiola, Japan’s Draft Charter Redefines Military, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2005, at 
A16. The revision faces significant hurdles: First it must be approved by a two-thirds vote in the Diet, 
and then it must also receive majority approval in a national referendum. Id.  
 150. The implications of such ambivalence on the legitimacy of Japan’s constitution are not 
explored in this Note, but carving out one Article as void of substantive meaning cannot bode well. 
 151. See supra notes 97–120 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 121–35 and accompanying text. 
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change to Article 9 is extremely unlikely.155 It is similarly unlikely that the 
Diet or Executive will reverse policy course, rein themselves in, and 
decrease the scope or scale of the SDF’s activities.156 All indications point 
to the SDF’s continued healthy existence, as well as an expansion of its 
responsibilities and duties.157 Thus, we are left with the regional status quo 
and cultural attachments. 
A “change in the regional security situation” means an outward 
event—likely a terrorist attack by a terrorist organization or an act of 
belligerence by one of Japan’s neighbors—causing a crisis that will force 
Japan to immediately confront the restrictions Article 9 places on its 
ability to defend itself or engage in preemptive strikes. However, neither a 
terrorist attack nor an act of belligerency by a neighbor is likely to 
occur.158 First, because Japan has limited its involvement internationally, it 
is not likely to be the target of terrorist attack.159 Second, an act of 
belligerency by one of Japan’s neighbors is similarly unlikely160 because 
these countries enjoy an uneasy status quo in spite of a decades-long 
brinksmanship giving the appearance of instability.161 The most obvious 
threat source is North Korea, but despite its agitations and occasional 
provocations aimed at extorting its neighbors, North Korea is unlikely to 
launch an offensive against Japan or another country in the region in the 
near future.162 Furthermore, given its historical refusal to participate in 
missions that might have a human cost,163 it is even possible that Japan 
 155. See supra notes 97–120 and accompanying text. 
 156. Although polls show shifting attitude among Diet members, there are three caveats. The first 
is that although a Diet member may answer “Should the Constitution be amended?” positively, he or 
she might not answer “Should Article 9 be amended?” in the same way. Second, although there is a 
growing consensus that Article 9 should be amended, members of this consensus are generally from 
the younger generation. Given the flashpoint nature of Article 9, as well as the difficulty amending the 
Constitution, it is unlikely that the younger generation could, at this point, amend Article 9 on its own 
will. Such an amendment would likely require a super-majority, both in the Diet and in the population 
generally. See NIHON KOKU KENPŌ [Constitution], art. 96 (Japan), reprinted in English in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN; ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947–1967, app. at 314 (Japanese Ministry of 
Justice trans. 1958, Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968) (1947), 
 157. Cf. Spend and Defend, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2004, at 42–43 (describing the Japanese 
government’s current plans for future SDF spending). 
 158. DUPONT, supra note 11, at 5. 
 159. Commentators have asserted, however, that if Japan gets drawn further into support of the 
United States’ “War on Terror,” its likelihood of being the target of terrorist attacks increases. 
Additionally, Japan was the victim of a domestic terrorist attack in 1997. Lawrence K. Altman, Nerve 
Gas that Felled Subway Riders Said to Be One of Most Lethal Known, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at 
A13. 
 160. DUPONT, supra note 11, at 5. 
 161. See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text. 
 162. Cf. When the Partying Has to Stop, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, at 40. 
 163. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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might withdraw inward in the event that an act of belligerency was 
committed within the region. Thus, the greatest potential for immediate 
change in Japanese law and policy is a direct attack against Japan by a 
neighboring power. However, barring a dramatic change to the status quo 
in the region, this is extremely unlikely.164  
The second source of change is already underway: a generational 
cycling reflected in shifting cultural attitudes and norms. The younger 
generation—we might call them the “après les après guerre”165—in Japan 
is already manifesting a different and more liberal attitude toward the SDF 
and Japan’s need to be involved internationally.166 This generation wants 
to see Japan have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council 
and realizes that Japan must prove itself worthy of the seat.167 It also is not 
scarred by memories of war168 and has an attitude that might be described 
as “pragmatic realism.”169 War guilt as an international or regional 
currency seems to be running on short reserve with this generation.170 
Once this generation matures and gains control of the Diet, the older 
generation will be swept out, and an Article 9 amendment will be more 
likely. Change to Article 9 will come as an incident of this generation’s 
different values.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
Currently, there is a mismatch between Article 9 and Japanese 
governmental actions with regard to the SDF and international 
involvement. This Note has taken the position that immediate change will 
only come through a blow to the regional security status quo and further, 
that such a blow likely would have to be directed against Japan itself. 
Barring such an immediate change, this Note discounts other possible 
sources of change and points to a long-term change in attitudes and values 
incident to a generational shift as the next likely source of Article 9 
amendment.171 Because of the difficulties in the amendment process and 
the emotional nature of the subject, a super-majority both in the Diet and 
 164. Cf. DUPONT, supra note 11, at 14 (Japan is unlikely to increase its defense budget “barring a 
major shock of unanticipated proportions such as a direct Chinese military threat . . . .”). 
 165. Cf. Chapman, supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 168. RAPP, supra note 128, at 30. 
 169. See generally DUPONT, supra note 11, at 2–6. 
 170. RAPP, supra note 128, at 30. 
 171. William E. Rapp shares the conclusion that “Japan, through incremental steps over a number 
of years, will significantly transform its security policy . . . .” Id. at 4. 
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in the population at large will be needed to amend Article 9. Such a super-
majority will be in place only once the older generation declines and is 
replaced by the younger generation. In other words, Japan must hurry up 
and wait.  
But what to do in the interim? That Japan should amend Article 9 does 
not mean that it should renounce Article 9 principles altogether. In the 
interim, Japan should work to ensure that its expansion of the SDF is 
limited to two areas: national self-defense and furtherance of international 
peace. Japan is still not fully capable of defending itself against an attack 
on its territory.172  
The more important question is how Japan might continue to contribute 
to the furtherance of international peace. Future participation in 
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions is critical, especially 
in light of Japan’s desire for a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council. As a nation dedicated to peace, Japan should consider 
deepening inter-operational ties to the United Nations and enmeshing its 
decision-making process about international involvement with that of the 
United Nations. As an international organization with the furtherance of 
world peace as its raison d’être, the United Nations is a legitimate vehicle 
through which Japan can participate in international peacekeeping. 
Additionally, Japan has the opportunity to lead by example and 
demonstrate the value of being truly invested in the international coalition 
that the United Nations represents. This involves not only the commitment 
of funds, but the commitment of personnel. While Japan would still have 
to consider its own interests, serving as a quasi-national adjunct to the 
United Nations could make it the forerunner in an era where security takes 
on a predominantly global and collective nature. 
This is not to say that Japan should leave behind its national concerns: 
after all, the politicians who make decisions about international 
involvement are the same politicians who answer to domestic 
constituencies. Instead, this proposal envisions that Japan, rather than 
quietly distancing itself from global concerns and conflicts, should take a 
leadership role in international relations to demonstrate that a country can 
be realistically committed to international peace without being confined to 
the role of perpetually-uninvolved outsider. 
 172. For a description of weaknesses in Japan’s defensive capability, see DUPONT, supra note 11, 
at 28, 31. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A long-term refusal to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is 
an unviable course of action and has negative implications for Japan’s 
constitutional and institutional political legitimacy. Japan’s Article 9 must 
be amended, but this process likely will not take place any time soon, 
constrained as it is by a host of factors. The sources of change with the 
greatest potential for causing amendment of Article 9 are either an outright 
attack on Japan or value-shifting manifested through generational cycling. 
Despite the perpetual, seemingly precarious state of affairs in Asia, Japan 
is in no danger of imminent attack and therefore imminent change is 
unlikely. However, the current younger generation has expressed the 
opinion that Article 9 needs to be amended, at least so that Japan may 
constitutionally defend itself.  
In the meantime, Japan should continue to dedicate itself to the 
maintenance of world peace. This most closely aligns its ideals with those 
of the United Nations. With its financial resources and expressed 
dedication to peace, Japan has the opportunity to emerge as the next leader 
of the United Nations by fully committing to the process that the United 
Nations represents. If Japan truly wants the international respect it craves, 
manifesting its peaceful ideals through cooperation with and dedication to 
the United Nations seems an ideal proving ground. 
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